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THE CASE AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
TERRY EASTLAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty-one years have passed since President John F Kennedy
began the modern era of affirmative action by issuing Executive
Order 10,9251 in response to the concerns of civil rights leaders. In
addition to forbidding government contractors from discriminating
on account of "race, creed, color, or national origin, ' '2 the order
required them to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment,
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. ' ' 3 In
due course, lawmakers stitched affirmative action into a series of
federal laws and regulations affecting all public employers and all
but the smallest private employers.4 Affirmative action, however,
was not limited to the employment context. Most notably, it ex-
tended to the admissions offices of colleges, universities, and pro-
fessional and graduate schools."
Those whom affirmative action was intended to benefit came to
include not only blacks, the original focus of Executive Order
10,925, but also, in most cases, Hispanics, Asian-Pacific Americans,
and Native Americans.6 By the early 1970s, affirmative action had
come to mean for most people most of the time, treating, as op-
posed to not treating, those belonging to the designated or pro-
tected groups with regard to their race, creed, color, or national
* Resident Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C. B.A., Van-
derbilt University, 1971; B.A., 1974, and M.A., 1980, Oxford University.
1. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963).
2. Id. at 449-50.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) (establishing equal employment
opportunities).
5. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272-77 (1978) (describing
preferential admissions policy for minorities at the Medical School of the University of Cali-
fornia at Davis in 1973 and 1974).
6. Affirmative action for women raises different issues and for that reason is not ad-
dressed in this paper.
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origin. Indeed, it meant treating members of protected groups in
such a way as to hire, promote, or admit the designated minorities
in enough instances that the total numbers of those so advanced
were not trivial.
However its supporters propose to justify affirmative action,
treating people with regard to their minority status is what affirm-
ative action means in practice today It has become a way of life
throughout the public sector and in many parts of the private sec-
tor. It is a way of life that many institutions, especially those of
higher education, are proud of. 7 Even affirmative action's most se-
vere critics must concede that it has done some good. It has helped
employers and other gatekeepers of opportunity understand that
the United States is indeed a nation of many peoples and
races-potentially as many as are found on the globe itself. It has
forced an often useful rethinking of employment and academic
standards and practices." Schools, businesses, and government,
chief among other bodies, have in some important ways become
fairer and more egalitarian.9 Also, many people who but for their
race would not have been given an opportunity have made the
most of the chances affirmative action afforded them; their
achievements are truly of the first rank. Although affirmative ac-
tion is not the only reason for these results, it is surely an impor-
tant one.
Merely touting the successes of affirmative action, of course, is to
glance at only one side of the ledger. On the other side are sub-
stantial costs. When examined in terms of both theory and prac-
tice, affirmative action deserves a negative judgment. Affirmative
action cannot remain a way of life unless we wish to change for the
worse the very essence of what it means to be an American.
7. See Judith Areen, Affirmatwe Actwn: The Benefits of Diversity, WASH. POST, May 26,
1991, at D7 (defending Georgetown Law Center's affirmative action program after a student
newspaper reported that black students were admitted to the school despite lower grade
point averages and Law School Admission Test scores).
8. See, e.g., id. (commenting on the value of diversity in the classroom which results from
affirmative action admissions policies).
9. Through the success of minority group members in its ranks, the military serves as a
prime example of a government body that has moved beyond its discriminatory past.
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I. PROBLEMS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Affirmative action arose as a response to the special case of
blacks in America, and indeed that is a special case. No other ra-
cial or ethnic group endured centuries of slavery and Jim Crow
laws. Past wrongs, it is said, must be corrected today Here, how-
ever, there is a set of problems for affirmative action. Even if past
wrongs and compensation for those wrongs can be inherited across
decades and centuries, how can blacks living today who are not the
descendants of the victims of past racial discriminationI0 be
"owed" the compensation of affirmative action? Similarly, how can
whites living today who are not the descendants of slave owners or
segregationists be morally obligated to pay for affirmative action
by losing out on a promotion or a place in medical school? Even if
we could identify all the descendants of those wronged in ages past
and all the descendants of those who committed the wrongs, and
then limit affirmative action to transactions between these groups,
the question would remain whether past wrongs and the duty to
compensate them can indeed be inherited. Unless we wish to live
our lives through our parents, grandparents, great-grandparents,
and beyond, the answer is obvious: they cannot be.
None of this discussion is to deny the special experience of
blacks in America. However, the best we can humanly do today, in
a nation that changes daily through death, birth, and immigration,
is to turn our face to the present and treat each one of those
around us honestly and honorably As Thomas Sowell has ob-
served, this is more than enough moral challenge."
As Sowell notes, some have made the argument in a more socio-
logical way, to wit, that blacks and other minorities living today
are suffering from the ill effects of past wrongs inflicted on their
forbears, and that it is these effects that affirmative action must
overcome." One obvious problem with this argument is that, even
if past discrimination against minorities has caused present disa-
bling effects in their descendants, it does not follow that affirma-
10. West Indian immigrants are an example of blacks whose ancestors did not endure
past racial discrimination in this country.
11. THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY 120-21 (1984).
12. Thomas Sowell, "Affirmatwe Action" A Worldwide Disaster, COMMENTARY, Dec.
1989, at 21, 30.
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tive action is the best response. More than one way exists to im-
prove the prospects for equality Unlike preferential affirmative
action, other means such as Head Start are more compatible with
the best in the American political tradition, and they enjoy the
majority support of the American people.13
A. The Case Against "Underrepresentation"
The arguments from history and sociology are sometimes made
in shorthand fashion in terms of "underrepresentation." Commen-
tators label a certain minority group as "underrepresented" for
reasons of historical discrimination or its present-day disabling ef-
fects in a given job or profession, and use percentages to make the
point. The American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), for
example, believes minorities are "underrepresented" by about one
third in the nation's newsrooms because roughly twenty-five per-
cent of the general population is black, Hispanic, Asian-American
or Native American, and yet not quite nine percent of all newspa-
per journalists are members of these minority groups. 4 ASNE
wants to correct this "underrepresentation" by hiring enough mi-
norities by the year 2000 so that twenty-five percent of newspaper
journalists will be minorities."5 The problem with arguments (con-
ceding that they are arguments) based on "underrepresentation" of
this most general kind is that the term is practically meaningless.
No one can say to what degree racial and ethnic groups should be
"represented" in various jobs and pursuits, and social science has
challenged powerfully the idea that they should be proportionately
"represented.""' Nonetheless, concepts of "underrepresentation"
and their like, such as "underutilization" and "disparity," have
crept into our language and law in such ways as to place a heavy
burden of proof on institutions whose work forces do not divide
into percentages reflecting approximate proportional representa-
13. See William Schneider, Public Against Social Issues Activism, 1985 NAT'L J. 2502,
2503.
14. Howard Kurtz, At Newspapers, A Clash of Perceptions About Push to Recruit Mi-
nority Staff, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1991, at A4.
15. Alex Jones, Of Hiring of Minorities and Newsroom Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1&, 1989,
§ 1, at 50.
16. Sowell, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that throughout the world it is extremely rare to
find racial and ethical groups proportionally represented in various occupations).
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tion based on race and ethnicity Such institutions are under social
pressure, if not also legal pressure, to justify the "underrepresenta-
tion" and correct their "deficiencies," or face correction by rele-
vant authorities, including the courts."7
Because the differences among racial groups in income levels and
jobs can be explained to some degree by such variables as age, edu-
cation, and work experience, advocates of affirmative action some-
times try to determine just how much "underrepresentation" is a
result of these factors. Once they determine that amount, they
make the problematic move of attributing the remaining amount
to past discrimination or its disabling effects, maintaining that this
irreducible underrepresentation must be "corrected" through af-
firmative action. Thus, in discussions about minority under-
representation on a university faculty, the more sophisticated ar-
gument for affirmative action will point to any "disparity" between
the number of minority professors hired in a particular academic
discipline and the number of minorities nationwide with the requi-
site credentials to be hired. The problem with this facially more
plausible comparison is that it errs in treating all credentials as
though they were alike. Not every credential, such as a PhD, is
created equal, and mere statistical comparisons cannot tell us the
quality of each Ph), or of the other merits an applicant might pos-
sess. To speak of underrepresentation even in this way is still dubi-
ous. Inevitably, we must focus on individual cases if we are to have
any hope of knowing who might be best qualified for a job, unless,
of course, we wish merely to congratulate ourselves for having
achieved a faculty that is demonstrably racially and ethnically di-
verse, even if at the expense of turning away more highly qualified
candidates.
B. The Exclusionary Effect
In addition to the usual arguments for affirmative action, the ac-
tual practice of affirmative action also deserves review. One impact
of affirmative action is visible in the line of Supreme Court cases
17. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) (expanding the use of underrepresentation percentages to
prove discrimination).
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initiated by plaintiffs named Marco DeFunis, i s Allan Bakke, 9 and
Brian Weber. ° These cases show that affirmative action is a bar-
rier to those who otherwise, because of their superior qualifica-
tions, would have advanced had they been members of the neces-
sary racial group. This denial of opportunity is a very real cost for
those who lose out on account of affirmative action, considering es-
pecially that these individuals are innocent of discriminatory con-
duct. Advocates of affirmative action take different views of this
cost, some even dismissing it,2 but there is no getting around the
fact that affirmative action is unfair action when it unambiguously
deprives nondiscriminatory actors of their opportunities.
Whites have been the primary victims of affirmative action, and
it may well be, as William Van Alstyne of Duke University Law
School has observed, that among whites, it is working-class
whites-or, in the case of educational opportunities, their off-
spring-who have been the largest class of affirmative action vic-
tims.22 If Van Alstyne is right, the elites in business, government,
or academe, have had to "pay" little, if any, of the exclusionary
cost of affirmative action.
Whites, though, are not the only victims of affirmative action.
Bear in mind that to benefit from affirmative action, one must be a
member of one of the minority groups covered by the program at
issue. Affirmative action, therefore, necessarily has an exclusionary
effect upon members of all noncovered groups. For this reason, not
all alleged victims of affirmative action are white. For example, in
early 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit struck down a blacks-only scholarship fund at the University
18. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Thirty-six out of 37 minority applicants
admitted to the University of Washington Law School had lower admission "Averages" than
DeFunis based on grade point averages and Law School Admission Test scores. Id. at 324.
19. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In both years Bakke ap-
plied to the Medical School at the University of California at Davis, minority applicants
were admitted with lower "benchmark scores." Id. at 277.
20. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Weber had more seniority than
seven black coworkers who received promotions for which Weber had been passed over. Id.
at 199.
21. See, e.g., Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholar's Statement on Affirmative Action
After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711, 1712 (1989).
22. TERRY EASTLAND & WILLIAM J. BENNETT, COUNTING By RACE 170 (1979).
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of Maryland at College Park.2" The plaintiff in that case, Dennis J.
Podberesky, had been admitted to Maryland. He had scored 1340
on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and possessed a 3.56 high
school grade point average.24 The mnimum academic requirements
for the scholarship he sought were a 900 SAT score and a 3.0 grade
point average.25 The unchangeable racial requirement for the
scholarship, however, was that the applicant be black,26 and Den-
nis J. Podberesky was and is Hispanic.
Because affirmative action excludes all those whom it does not
include, it creates incentives for those excluded to acquire the cre-
dentials necessary for inclusion. Stories are not uncommon of indi-
viduals who have attempted to give themselves the kind of sur-
names that might entitle them to affirmative action treatment.28
Business set-aside programs 29 have attracted companies fraudu-
lently representing themselves as being owned by minorities.30
Thus, although affirmative action has performed a useful function
by reminding employers and admissions officers that ours is a na-
tion of all peoples, it has also encouraged what the public choice
theorists31 could have foretold-rent-seeking behavior. The correc-
tion of this behavior requires a vigilant enforcement apparatus
that is able and willing to inquire into matters of race and
ethnicity
23. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
24. Id. at 53.
25. Id. at 54.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. In 1975 two whites applying for jobs as Boston firefighters failed the applicable civil
service exam. In 1977 they reapplied to take the test, saying they were black. They both
scored below the standard minimum acceptable for white applicants but were hired appar-
ently on the basis of their "race." Both were dismissed in 1988 after a Department of Per-
sonnel Administration hearing on their case. Susan Diesenhouse, Boston Case Raises Ques-
tions on Misuse of Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1988, § 1, at 54.
29. Set-aside programs typically involve a government body "setting aside" a specific por-
tion of government contracts or grants for minority group access only. See, e.g., Alan Finder,
Daunting New Task: Helping Minority Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, § 1, pt. 1, at
46 (reporting New York City's Mayor David Dinkins' plan to set aside more than five billion
dollars a year in city contracts for companies owned by minorities and women).
30. Id. (revealing that companies will often set up fronts, such as declaring a minority
employee a 51% owner, in order to qualify for the preferential government treatment).
31. For an overview of public choice theory, see Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988).
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C. The Devaluation of Testing
Affirmative action has led to more careful consideration of quali-
fication tests to determine their fairness, what they are testing for,
and, in the employment context, their relevance to the job to be
done. It has also led to an indefensible devaluing of testing. An
example of such devaluation is the "race-norming" of what was un-
til recently the most widely used job test in the country, the Gen-
eral Aptitude Test Battery (GATB).3 2 The Labor Department con-
ceived the practice of race-norming GATB scores in the late stages
of the Carter administration and pursued it during the Reagan and
Bush administrations until its revelation in 1990 led to its pro-
scription under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 33 In 1981, the United
States Employment Service, a division within the Labor Depart-
ment, recommended that state Employment Service agencies
should stop reporting job candidates' scores on the GATB in rela-
tion to all other test takers and report them only in relation to
those of the same race. 4 So it happened: the testers ranked black
applicants relative only to other blacks, Hispanics only to other
Hispanics, and "others" to all but blacks and Hispanics.3 5 Test of-
ficials converted raw scores on the tests to percentile scores accord-
ing to the standing of the test takers within their own comparison
group. Before presenting the results to a prospective employer, the
officials combined the percentile scores from the several compari-
son groups without reference to the race of the test takers and
then listed the scores as though they had graded everyone by the
same nonracial norms.36 The fiftieth percentile score of a black,
therefore, was not necessarily the same as the fiftieth percentile
score of a white, even though both names were listed together
without reference to race in the final ordering.
Neither employers nor jobseekers were aware of this practice,
which no fewer than forty states adopted.3 7 Once the media publi-
32. Race-Norming, Finis, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 1991, at A12.
33. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 106.
34. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Rigging Test Scores by Race, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 1991, at 21.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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cized race-norming in 1990 and 199138 it could not survive. Al-
though the Civil Rights Act of 1991 bans score adjustment of a
test, 9 the Bush Labor Department has warned, in announcing an
end to race-norming, that raw GATB scores should be "only one
factor in the selection and referral process, with appropriate weight
given to other factors. ' 40 Thus, the devaluing of a particular test
has stopped, but the general devaluing of objective testing mea-
sures in "the selection and referral process" has not necessarily
ceased. Those "other factors" will intrude as long as affirmative
action persists.
On this point, Regents of the University of Californma v. Bakke41
is instructive. Allan Bakke challenged the admissions program of
the Medical School at the University of California at Davis (UC-
Davis), which set aside sixteen of one hundred places in each class
for members of the preferred minority groups. 42 The Supreme
Court struck down this "rigid" program,4 3 but Justice Powell's piv-
otal opinion said that race may be a "plus" in the admissions pro-
cess.44 On this basis, after Bakke, UC-Davis proceeded automati-
cally to award each minority applicant five points on account of
race.45 Because an applicant needed a total of only fifteen points
before being grouped among those to be given first consideration
for admission, the award of five points made the Medical College
Admissions Test and undergraduate grade point average less im-
portant for the preferred minorities, and even more important for
all others.46
D. The Stigma of Affirmative Action
Perhaps the most damning judgment against affirmative action,
as it is typically practiced today, comes in the form of objections
38. The Richmond Times-Dispatch led the way. See Race-Normtng, Finrs, supra note 32,
at A12.
39. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 106.
40. Race-Norming, Finis, supra note 32, at A12.
41. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
42. Id. at 279. The preferred minority groups included blacks, Chicanos, Asians and
American Indians. Id. at 274.
43. Id. at 271.
44. Id. at 317.
45. EASTLAND & BENNETT, supra note 22, at 194.
46. Id.
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that could only be expressed by blacks and members of other mi-
nority groups typically included in affirmative action programs.
Their criticisms concern the costs borne by the ostensible benefi-
ciaries of affirmative action. For example, an Hispanic officer for
the Bank of America asks: "Sometimes I wonder: Did I get this job
because of my abilities, or because they needed to fill a quota?"4 7
Glenn Loury of Boston University has said that affirmative action
can undermine "the ability of people to confidently assert, if only
to themselves, that they are as good as their achievements would
seem to suggest. '48 In The Content of Our Character, Shelby
Steele examines the "enlargement of self-doubt" caused by affirm-
ative action.4 9 "Under affirmative action the quality that earns us
preferential treatment is an implied inferiority However this infer-
iority is explained it is still inferiority "I0 So long as affirmative
action governs an institution in which such concerns are expressed,
objections of this nature can be expected to continue.
What is especially perverse about affirmative action is its sugges-
tion that all protected minorities are alike, that for each minority
group member, race has been an equal factor in his or her achieve-
ment. This suggestion, of course, is not true, but it will be surpass-
ingly hard to know as long as affirmative action exists. In 1987,
three black students at the University of Virginia Law School
made law review just after the adoption of an affirmative action
plan for selecting law review members.5 They were confident, how-
ever, that they could have made law review under the previous se-
lection procedures and evidently wished they had. 52 One of them
told William Raspberry of the Washington Post, "Affirmative ac-
tion was a way to dilute our personal victory It took the victory
out of our hands. '53
47. Sonia L. Nazario, Many Minorities Feel Torn by Experience of Affirmative Action,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 1989, at Al.
48. Glen Loury, Crisis in Black America, Address at the National Press Club (Dec. 17,
1985).
49. SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER 116 (1990).
50. Id.
51. William Raspberry, Affirmative Action That Hurts Blacks, WASH. POST, Feb. 23,
1987, at All.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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The practical problems of affirmative action that I have sur-
veyed stem from its central focus on race and ethnicity To state
the obvious, affirmative action is not race-neutral. Advocates, nev-
ertheless, tout affirmative action as an instrument of equality Af-
firmative action raises the question of how true equality can be
achieved when ostensible equals know that there are different rules
for different racial groups. Surely members of minority groups who
have rejected the putative benefits of programs for which they are
eligible have asked and answered this question in a telling way
The story of Freddie Hernandez, a Hispanic who serves in the
Miami fire department, serves as an example. In 1983 Hernandez
rejected an affirmative action promotion to lieutenant. 4 Instead,
he waited three years until he had the necessary seniority and had
scored high enough to qualify for the promotion under procedures
that applied to all nonminorities.55 This decision cost Hernandez
$4,500 a year in extra pay and forced him to study 900 additional
hours to attain the required test results.6 Hernandez told the Wall
Street Journal, "I knew I could make it on my own. ' ' s
III. A'RETURN TO RACE-NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
Inevitably, affirmative action forces us to attend to the basic
question of whether race should be a deciding factor in the alloca-
tion of society's benefits and opportunities. The best in the Ameri-
can political tradition answered that question negatively, at least
until the early 1960s. Drawing on this tradition, for example,
Thurgood Marshall argued in the 1948 case of Sipuel v. Board of
Regents,58 a forerunner to Brown v. Board of Education,9 that
"[c]lassifications and distinctions based on race or color have no
moral or legal validity in our society 06o Embedded in this state-
ment was the moral truth that the mere race of a person tells us
nothing morally important about him or her that should compel
54. Nazario, supra note 47, at A10.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1959).
60. Petitioner's Brief, Sipuel (No. 369), quoted in RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 259
(1976).
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either negative or positive treatment. In his book, First Things,
Hadley Arkes elaborates: "Merely by knowing a person's race we
cannot know that he has done a wrong and deserves punish-
ment; neither can we know that he has suffered an injury and de-
serves compensation."'" This discussion is not to deny what social
science reports about Americans when examined in terms of their
racial and ethnic groups. However, social science by its own terms
is interested in groups, not individuals, and it is to individuals that
we owe just treatment.
Race-neutral principles informed our greatest civil rights legisla-
tion, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 This statute created a federal
right of equal employment opportunity for every individual.63 Con-
gress rejected the idea of race-based affirmative action, including
in the new law a provision stating that nothing in Title VII is to be
interpreted as requiring an employer to grant preferential treat-
ment to any individual or group on account of racial imbalance.6 4
In Equality Transformed, Herman Belz writes that Title VII "con-
stitutes a clear rejection of the demand for preferential treat-
ment" 5 and "requires equal opportunity based on individual
rights and is intended to prohibit race-conscious employment
practices." 6
Until at least 1964, equal opportunity was central to the defini-
tion of America. Whereas traditional hierarchical societies had or-
ganized themselves on the basis of race, religion, social rank, or
family, the United States, in its origins and development, aspired
to an equality of opportunity for individuals in which these charac-
teristics would not control. Toward this end, and in regard to race
in particular, nondiscrimination laws became necessary to ensure
that these inherited traits truly did not matter and that each indi-
vidual was judged according to what he had done. "Equality of op-
portunity," Belz observes, "is the social philosophy of modern in-
61. HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS 98 (1986).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
63. Id. § 2000e.
64. Id. § 2000e-2(J).
65. HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER CENTURY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
26 (1991).
66. Id.
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dustrial societies. It is individual-regarding and presupposes a
single class based on common citizenship."
A. The Primacy of Race-Consciousness in Affirmative Action
Affirmative action not only contradicts the principle that race
should be irrelevant in the allocation.of society's goods and oppor-
tunities, but also proposes to displace the philosophy of equal op-
portunity, of which the race-neutral principle is a key element. In
the 1960s, and to some degree in the 1970s, affirmative action did
not propose to undermine equal opportunity Indeed, most initial
advocates of race preferences implicitly recognized the moral supe-
riority of the principle of colorblindness, arguing that race-con-
scious measures would be only "temporary "68 Most supporters of
affirmative action said they envisioned a day when race would not
be a basis for employment or admissions decisions. Most also ap-
peared to keep faith with the philosophy of equal opportunity,
maintaining that someday each person would be allowed to rise to
whatever level he could, on the strength of his own abilities and
talents.69
Today, however, most advocates of affirmative action have ac-
commodated their once-liberal principles to the practices they now
endorse. Some supporters have come to embrace a new social phi-
losophy In Bakke, Justice Blackmun said that we must take race
into account in order to get beyond racism. 0 Now, we take race
into account because race itself has become a basis for evaluation.
For some advocates of affirmative action, the notion has transpired
that race is morally interesting after all, and it is part of any re-
67. Id. at 10.
68. Thus, in 1984, Father Robert F Drinan described affirmative action as having been
adopted as "an interim strategy for a period during which sex-based and race-rooted dis-
crimination will gradually fade away." Robert F Drinan, Affirmative Action Under Attack,
in RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE 117, 124 (Russell Nieli ed., 1991).
69. A Gallup survey in 1977 supports the idea of "ability as the main consideration."
Among nonsouthern Democrats and nonwhite respondents, traditional supporters of affirm-
ative action, 81% and 64% respectively stated that ability, not membership in a minority
group, should be the main consideration in getting jobs and places in college. RACIAL PREF-
ERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 68, app. C at 513.
70. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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spectable definition of individual merit." These advocates would
decide the allocation of society's goods and opportunities on the
very basis that the old liberalism once so firmly rejected. It bears
emphasis that affirmative action, so conceived, cannot be tempo-
rary but must be permanent. This is because once race, or "diver-
sity," as some now camouflage it, is admitted to be meritorious in
and of itself, and thus relevant to the distribution of a society's
opportunities, then race must be taken into account for its own
sake in perpetuity72 Equal results for racial and ethnic groups,
rather than equal opportunity for individuals, is the essence of to-
day's affirmative action. Indeed, the individual disappears from
the new philosophy of affirmative action.
If race should be the basis for the allocation of society's goods
and opportunities, and if racial groups matter more than individu-
als, then we must accept affirmative action as it has evolved, even
if such acceptance requires us to jettison the best in the American
tradition. Race cannot serve this purpose, however, because the
mere fact of a person's race is morally uninteresting.
The danger of affirmative action lies in the kind of society it pro-
poses to create. When conceived as a permanent feature of Ameri-
can life, affirmative action requires permanent attention to race
and, therefore, permanent social engineering of a kind necessary to
overcome problems of "underrepresentation," "disparity," and the
like.7" In such a society, race and ethnicity necessarily will become
more and more important. Affirmative action that takes us in this
direction must be considered disharmonious when judged against
the best in the American political tradition.
71. See, e.g., Areen, supra note 7, at D7 (discussing the value of diversity in the classroom
as a justification for preferential admission policies).
72. In 1983, the city of Richmond, Virginia, held a hearing on whether to adopt an ordi-
nance requiring that 30% of all public-works contracts be subcontracted to businesses
owned by blacks or members of other officially designated minority groups. Terry Eastland,
Racial Preference in Court (Again), COMMENTARY, Jan. 1989, at 32, 33. The ordinance's
expiration date of 1988 drew a response from the Mayor, who said he believed "we were
going to perpetuity with" the ordinance. Id. at 36. The city did not change the ordinance,
although the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). My point here is that the Mayor spoke the new language of affirm-
ative action, which now sees the policy not as an interim, but a perpetual measure.
73. See supra part II. A. (discussing underrepresentation and disparity).
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B. Genuine Equality
Herman Belz observes that the federal government has never re-
ally tried race-neutral equal opportunity, at least not for long.7 4
Soon after Congress codified that idea in law in 1964, the federal
bureaucracy and the courts began enforcing color-conscious equal
results.7 6 The time has come, however, to consider trying what we
once proposed to try Now is as good a time as any to do so, be-
cause affirmative action has yielded a few, although only a few,
useful benefits. Affirmative action has made almost all employers
and universities think about recruiting truly far and wide. R.
Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., has remarked that "[t]here are very few
places in the United States today where you could dip a recruit-
ment net and come up with nothing but white males.' 77 Racial and
ethnic diversity exists in almost every line queuing up for some
opportunity or other.
Under race-neutral equal opportunity that does not compromise
standards-or that holds everyone to the same standards-most
minorities in the various queues would be hired or admitted, if not
by the employer or institution of choice, then by someone some-
where. The difference, therefore, would be in the distribution, for
minorities covered by affirmative action programs would find op-
portunities commensurate with their qualifications. Yet their qual-
ifications would be the same as all those of nonminorities in the
same positions. Genuine equality thus would be possible. In a uni-
verse explicitly without affirmative action, no one could doubt the
basis for advancement, and no minority could doubt his own
achievements. Furthermore, the exclusionary effects of affirmative
action would not exist, nor would incentives that promote rent-
seeking behavior and efforts by new or old immigrant groups seek-
ing to establish themselves as a new protected group.7 8
Phasing out affirmative action would require patience. It was im-
patience with the potential achievement of race-neutral equal op-
74. BELZ, supra note 65, at 235-39.
75. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)).
76. See BELZ, supra note 65, at 43-68.
77. R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., From Affirmative Action to Affirming Diversity, HARV. Bus.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 107, 108.
78. See supra part II. B (discussing these effects of affirmative action).
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portunity that motivated many well-intentioned Americans to em-
bark upon the experiment in preferential treatment. Indeed, the
best argument for implementing affirmative action was not one
that drew on history or sociology, or some combination. Rather the
better argument was the practical one which maintained that hav-
ing a much larger black middle class was in the public interest, and
that the jump start of affirmative action, although requiring a tem-
porary suspension of our best principles, might in a few years be
able to achieve that end. The economic studies of affirmative ac-
tion in employment are inconclusive,79 and affirmative action sim-
ply may have reshuffled middle class minorities into government
jobs or jobs regulated by the government.8 0
Whatever the economic impact of affirmative action, those who
made this practical argument in the past must now reflect, as col-
umnist Charles Krauthammer has, on the various costs of affirma-
tive action.81 Whether one agrees that protected minorities would
have been better off had the nation been more patient from the
late 1960s onward, many good reasons support adopting race-neu-
tral principles and fashioning policy accordingly Such an approach
would not foreclose affirmative action programs that focus on dis-
advantage rather than race. Affirmative action that takes into ac-
count individual circumstances such as racial discrimination, eco-
nomic hardship, or family disintegration, which the applicant has
worked hard to overcome, asks the right question-a question
about the individual. This brand of affirmative action is a far cry
from the program that simply awards points on the basis of race.82
79. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUB-
LIC POLICY 63 (1987) (noting the difficulty of qualifying the many factors that contribute to
the distribution of jobs in the labor force); Richard A. Posner, The Defunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 17
(noting lack of evidence concerning the root causes of minority choice in employment);
Thomas Sowell, Weber and Bakke, and the Presuppositions of Affirmative Action, 26
WAYNE L. REv. 1309, 1314-16 (1980) (assessing empirical presuppositions of affirmative
action).
80. See BELZ, supra note 65, at 235-39.
81. See Charles Krauthammer, Quota by Threat, WASH. POST, May 18, 1990, at A19 (not-
ing the danger of "implied inferiority" that results from affirmative action, which not only
demoralizes blacks, but also incites white racism).
82. I first argued this position in 1979. See EASTLAND & BENNETT, supra note 22, at 164.
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C. Transcending the Current Political Structure
Inevitably the important question of political leadership re-
mains. Through the end of 1991, neither political party has given
reason to believe that it can provide the kind of leadership neces-
sary to take us beyond affirmative action, as it has developed, to-
ward the kind of public policies that are race-neutral and promise
to enhance opportunity for more of our citizens. The Republican
Party rails against racial quotas even as it accepts other forms of
racial preference.8 3 Its opposition to quotas is merely a tactical
ploy designed to wedge white Democratic voters into Republican
columns. No prominent Republican has made the best case against
today's affirmative action-the inclusive case, which points out
that any race-based affirmative action program is necessarily exclu-
sive of whites and noncovered minorities, and that such programs
inevitably divide us all. Instead, as occurred in North Carolina in
the 1990 Senate race, we see ads pitting whites against blacks.
84
Republicans should look to their own heritage and to Lincoln in
particular. Lincoln demonstrated unsurpassed statesmanship
guided by the great truth of the Declaration of Independence that
all men are created equal.85
Republicans are not the only ones who need to be tutored by
Lincoln. The Democratic Party has allowed itself to become, as the
title of a recent book calls it, the "minority party";8 a party de-
fined by its commitment to certain minority groups. Manifestly
untrue of the party in the 1960s, the Democratic Party today has
no national figure willing to raise the standard of race neutrality
and invite his party to take the lead in recovering the best in the
American political tradition as the basis for a new pursuit of
equality
Given the current state of the two parties with respect to this
fundamental issue, one can expect more of the same: Republican
83. Despite their rhetoric, neither the Reagan nor the Bush administration made coherent
efforts to eliminate quotas and other race preferences.
84. See Alan McConagha, Helms' Victory Follows Pattern; Floors Pundits, Pollsters Who
Thought Race Was Over, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at B7 (discussing a Helms campaign
advertisement depicting a white worker crumbling a job-rejection letter while the narrator
says the position went to a less qualified applicant who was a member of a minority group).
85. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
86. PETER BROWN, MINOERITY PARTY (1991).
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rhetoric against quotas, Democratic agreement that quotas are
bad, but that affirmative action grounded in race is nonetheless
good, and policy stasis that allows affirmative action more or less
to continue in its current, racially exclusionary form. The tragedy
is that meanwhile, a great complex of issues lies untreated beyond
affirmative action. Although these issues bear on life's prospects
and the nature of opportunity in America, our leaders will not ad-
dress them as directly as they should. These issues concern health,
safety in the streets, and education, both academic and vocational.
More attention must focus on, among other things, improving the
quality of education in all schools. Especially deserving of improve-
ments are those schools in which minorities are predominant, par-
ticularly the elementary grades, kindergarten, pre-kindergarten,
and apprentice programs in which those without adequate job
skills can learn them.
Curiously, polling data suggests that the American people might
be receptive to principled, prudent leadership that proposes going
beyond affirmative action and rebuilding the national consensus on
civil rights and equal opportunity 87 For years now, large majorities
of Americans have expressed opposition to preferential treatment
on the basis of race."8 At the same time, Americans remain
strongly opposed to racial discrimination and are willing to help
minorities at the wholesale level through race-neutral programs
such as Head Start.8 9
87. See supra note 69.
88. Mass opinion remains invariably opposed to preferential treatment for de-
prived groups. The Gallup Organization repeated the same question five times
between 1977 and 1989: Some people say that to make up for past discrimina-
tion, women and minorities should be given preferential treatment in getting
jobs and places in college. Others say that ability, as determined by test scores,
should be the main consideration. Which point of view comes closest to how
you feel on the subject? In each survey, 10 or 11 percent said that minorities
should be given preferential treatment, while 81, 83, or 84 percent replied that
ability should be the determining factor.
Seymour M. Lipset, Affirmative Action and the American Creed, WILSON Q., Winter 1992,
at 52, 58.
89. Id. at 53.
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IV CONCLUSION
Another reason exists for principled, prudent leadership of the
kind I have described. With the end of the Cold War, as Seymour
Martin Lipset has observed, undoubtedly "much of the world will
see a new emphasis on competitive meritocracy and individual-
ism." 90 In the world context, it would be ironic if the first new na-
tion built not upon race, ethnicity, or religion, but upon the idea
that all persons are created equal, continued policies whose focus
on race may well make it less competitive in international markets.
One can only wish that some national politician of correct princi-
ple, who understands the case against the present regime of affirm-
ative action, will map a prudent strategy for the American future
that seeks to leave behind this affirmative action regime as the "in-
terim" measure it was once vouchsafed to be. The alternative is a
body politic increasingly embittered by measures that count by
race but do not, and cannot, forge genuine equality
90. Id. at 62.
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